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JR-FR-35 R3 
How Does the Franchisor’s Choice of Different Control Mechanisms Affect 
Franchisees’ and Employee-Managers’ Satisfaction? 
 
Abstract 
Satisfaction of franchisees and employee-managers affects the overall performance of a 
franchise system. We argue that different actors in the same franchise system need to be 
treated in different ways. The franchisor’s choice of control mechanisms affects the 
satisfaction of franchisees and employee-managers differently. To our knowledge this is the 
first study that gathers primary data from franchisees and employee-managers in the same 
franchise system at the store level with almost identical questionnaires. We show based on 
data from the largest German franchise system that outcome control leads to higher 
satisfaction among franchisees and employee-managers, while behavior control enhances 
employee-managers’ satisfaction. Thereby, outcome control leads to higher satisfaction 
among more experienced franchisees, while behavior control enhances both highly and lowly 
experienced employee-managers’ satisfaction. Our results suggest that franchisors face a 
dilemma: On the one hand, behavior control is associated with high costs and has no impact 
on franchisees’ satisfaction at all. On the other hand, it might still be necessary to prevent 
franchisees from behaving opportunistically.  
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Introduction 
Franchising has become one of the most influential forms of retailing during the last 
decades (Beheler, Norton and Sen 2008; Dant 2008; Elango and Fried 1997). Most franchise 
systems are characterized by the coexistence of varying fractions of franchised and company-
owned units under the same brand name (Bradach 1997; Sorenson and Sørensen 2001). Dant 
(2008) states that there are only few studies from the franchisees’ perspective as compared to 
the amount of research from the franchisors’ viewpoint. Single-country studies primarily 
originating from the US-American context and drawing on data from the fast-food industry 
dominate the field. We add to Dant’s critique the observation that franchisees’ and employee-
managers’ needs and positions are seldom juxtaposed and predominantly investigated from 
the franchisor’s perspective (e.g., Garg, Rasheed and Priem 2005; Yin and Zajac 2004). This 
gap is puzzling with regard to the prevalence and popularity of the plural form in franchising 
practice (Bradach 1997).  
In this study we ask: How does the franchisor’s choice of different control mechanisms 
affect franchisees’ and employee-managers’ satisfaction levels in a franchise system? Studies 
from the franchisees’ perspective focus on franchisee satisfaction, since it affects overall 
franchise system performance, the arrangement’s future attractiveness and its maintenance in 
the long run (Dermer 1974; Gassenheimer, Baucus and Baucus 1996; Hing 1995; Morrison 
1996). However, franchisees are only one part of a plural form-franchise system. From an 
agency perspective, ownership and goal achievement are split among the franchisor, the 
franchisees and the company-owned units (Eisenhardt 1989; Sen 1993). “The franchisor-
franchisee relationship is a classic case of an agency relationship, as is the relationship 
between a chain’s headquarters manager and a hired outlet supervisor” (Garg, Rasheed and 
Priem 2005, 188). Therefore, we need to explain both franchisee and employee-manager 
satisfaction with reference to goal and incentive alignment with franchisors. Due to their 
different positions within the franchise system, the impact of the determinants of franchisee 
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and employee-manager satisfaction may differ and lead to different satisfaction levels. Factors 
that promote franchisee satisfaction need not nurture satisfaction among employee-managers, 
since their assessments of the same factors, especially the franchisor’s choice of mechanisms 
for monitoring their efforts and behaviors may differ. As an executive in Bradach’s seminal 
study points out, “The worst thing you can do is treat a franchisee like an employee” (Bradach 
1997, 300).  
Throughout this study, we aim to contribute to the franchising literature as follows: First, 
we take Dant’s (2008, 93) claim to deepen our understanding of the franchisee’s side into 
account and additionally consider the employee-managers’ viewpoint. Whereas prior 
literature mainly concentrates on issues pertaining to governance form choice, i.e., the optimal 
proportion of franchised and company-owned entities in a plural form-franchise system, the 
purpose of this study is to analyze the effectiveness of different control mechanisms for 
governing existing amounts of franchised and company-owned outlets in a single franchise 
arrangement in a retail setting (e.g., Brickley and Dark 1987; Lafontaine and Kaufmann 1994; 
Lafontaine and Slade 2001; Sen 1993). To our knowledge, control mechanisms in post-
formation franchise system management are under-researched. Our study thus provides a 
novel approach. Second, based on agency theory, we identify factors that influence franchisee 
and employee-manager satisfaction and test our conceptual framework with a unique dataset 
from the tourism industry, namely with data from the largest German franchise system. To 
our knowledge this is the first study that gathers primary data from franchisees and employee-
managers in the same franchise system at the store level with almost identical questionnaires. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: We begin with a systematization of 
the satisfaction concept. Then, we present our theoretical framework and hypotheses, before 
we describe our dataset, variables and methods for theory-testing. Finally, we discuss our 
findings and outline implications for further research on plural form-franchise systems.  
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Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
Franchisee and Employee-Manager Satisfaction 
Satisfaction relies on individual perceptions of factors that characterize an organization 
and directly concern its members. Franchisee satisfaction has not been studied in conjunction 
with employee-manager satisfaction, yet, although franchisees’ and employee-managers’ 
satisfaction affects the franchise system’s overall performance and its viability in the long run. 
It is essential for explaining the principal’s choice of control mechanisms that govern the 
franchisor-franchisee and the employer-employee relationships as two different types of 
agency relationships within the same franchise system. 1  Franchisees’ and employee-
managers’ satisfaction levels are analyzed, since they involve all characteristics of the 
relationship between a franchisor and his franchisees and employee-managers and determine 
overall system performance (Ruekert and Churchill 1984).2  
Franchisees and employee-managers are comparable with regard to their tasks, 
capabilities, and working context. Irrespective of their status as a franchisee or an employee, 
travel agents sell products and services based on their knowledge on, e.g., travel destinations 
and means of transportation. They provide travel booking services to individuals, groups, and 
companies, and use information and communication technologies in order to coordinate their 
cooperation with the franchisor (Bradach 1997). Factors that affect franchising and 
                                                 
1 We do not analyze the externalities that are the very idea of a plural form-franchise system, i.e., to generate 
positive externalities in the form of, e.g., product innovations developed in company-owned outlets that are 
subsequently applied in the entire system. The plural form-franchise system is an organizational form that 
internalizes these externalities.  
2 The unit of analysis in agency theory research is the contract that governs the relationship between a principal 
and his agents. Most studies drawing on agency theory investigate formal and explicit contracts. Any mutual 
agreement between two parties can be viewed as a contract and outcomes of contractual relationships do not 
have to be formal (e.g., monetary rewards or sanctions). Hence, agency theory is also applicable to social 
assessments of (informal) contracts, e.g., satisfaction. In franchise systems, satisfaction of franchisees and 
employee-managers is essential for explaining the principal’s choice of control mechanisms that are the 
implementation of franchising and employment contracts. They govern franchisor-franchisee and employer-
employee relationships. Satisfaction is important as it is an indicator of how efficiently control mechanisms for 
agency relationships in a single plural form-franchise system are implemented and executed. It is an indicator 
for how efficiently the costs of information and risk-bearing in both types of agency relationships in that 
system are organized (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992; Eisenhardt 1989; Lafontaine and Slade 2001).  
JR-FR-35 R3 
 4
employment contracts might create different levels of satisfaction depending on whether an 
agent is a franchisee or an employee-manager. Outcome and behavior control are the 
implementation of franchising and employment contracts (Rubin 1978). Satisfaction is 
promoted by different combinations of control mechanisms, depending on the type of contract. 
Being part of the same franchise system, franchisees and employee-managers share a common 
organizational context. Franchise systems adopt various combinations of control mechanisms 
in order to achieve appropriate levels of satisfaction among franchisees and employee-
managers despite the shared context (Payne 2006).  
Control Mechanisms in Plural Form-Franchise Systems 
Control mechanisms are instruments that are used to monitor the activities and behaviors 
of the members of an organization (Koza and Dant 2007). The franchisor’s monitoring efforts 
aim at preventing franchisees and employee-managers from behaving opportunistically.3 He 
seeks to induce them to comply with the clauses and criteria included in their franchising or 
employment contracts, respectively (Garg, Rasheed and Priem 2005). The franchisor has two 
options. On the one hand, he can evaluate franchisees’ and employee-managers’ realized 
outcomes. The rewards that the agents get depend on their performance outcomes that need to 
meet the franchisor’s expectations and goals, e.g., the sales volume that has to be achieved. 
On the other hand, the franchisor can use monitoring systems that help determine rewards 
based upon agreed job behaviors. The agreed job behaviors can be evaluated, e.g., with field 
observations by a manager from the headquarters of the franchise system (Beheler, Norton 
and Sen 2008; Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992).  
Plural form-franchise systems in the retailing industry require a mixture of control types 
(Bradach 1997; Lusch and Jaworski 1991). Outcome control mechanisms specify results that 
                                                 
3 In line with Ghoshal and Moran (1996), we differentiate between opportunistic attitude, i.e., the proclivity to 
act in a self-interested manner, and opportunistic behavior, i.e., the behavioral manifestation of this attitude 
(Wathne and Heide 2000). We here assume a potentially opportunistic attitude that need not become manifest 
in harmful actions, e.g., hiding information, shirking or cheating. Opportunism is hence an exogenous variable 
that justifies the implementation of control mechanisms in plural form-franchise systems.  
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are to be achieved by the franchise system and its units. They do not specify how a particular 
task may be fulfilled but what performance objectives need to be realized (Dekker 2004; Koza 
and Dant 2007). For instance, the franchisor can assess the extent to which goals regarding 
sales, budgets and other financial ratios are met. Franchisees think entrepreneurially and 
expect a certain leeway to act within the constraints that a franchise system might impose. 
Outcome control that involves incentives that drive a franchisee’s motivation to pursue the 
franchisor’s goals without constraining his autonomy are thus appropriate to increase his 
satisfaction (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992). Employee-managers tend to be more risk-
averse than franchisees (Stewart, Watson, Carland and Carland 1998). Therefore, they may be 
less willing to accept the exploratory search that is needed to find out how to achieve pre-
specified performance outcomes without or with only a few explicit behavioral guidelines on 
how the franchisor’s expectations may be met. They instead prefer incentives that help them 
maintain established standards (Sorenson and Sørensen 2001).  
H1a:  Franchisee satisfaction is positively affected by the extent of perceived outcome 
control. 
H1b: Employee-manager satisfaction is negatively affected by the extent of perceived 
outcome control. 
Behavior control mechanisms, e.g., standard operating procedures, rules and regulations, 
stipulate in what manner members of the franchise system need to fulfill their tasks. They are 
used to monitor whether actual behaviors correspond to pre-specified behaviors (Dekker 
2004). Franchisors tend to use more behavior than outcome control mechanisms to monitor 
employee-managers’ efforts. Employee-managers get incentives to comply with the 
headquarters’ pre-specified behaviors to maintain established practices and routines (Sorenson 
and Sørensen 2001). Thus, more entrepreneurially thinking individuals may feel restricted. 
Franchisees that are running a unit within a franchise arrangement on their own and have to 
make specific investments are likely to have a higher propensity to take risks than employee-
managers (Stewart, Watson, Carland and Carland 1998). They are likely to prefer a control 
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type that does not constrain their behavior. A strong emphasis on behavior control may 
decrease their satisfaction.  
H2a:  Franchisee satisfaction is negatively affected by the extent of perceived behavior 
control. 
H2b: Employee-manager satisfaction is positively affected by the extent of perceived 
behavior control. 
The Interplay between Experience and Control  
The relationships between the franchisor, the franchisees, and the hired outlet managers 
develop over time. Experience shapes franchisees’ and employee-managers’ satisfaction 
levels in different ways. The duration of franchisor-franchisee or employer-employee 
relationships contributes to the stability of the entire arrangement (Cochet, Dormann and 
Ehrmann 2008). The formation of routines for intra- and interorganizational coordination may 
strengthen these relationships, because they facilitate control or even make control 
mechanisms obsolete (Hoang and Rothaermel 2005). The repeated cooperation in franchise 
systems between the franchisor and the franchisees as well as the franchisor and the 
employee-managers can lead to refined interfaces between these actors for communication 
and decision-making. The introduction of conflict resolution routines and effective channels 
for knowledge transfer may further contribute to the emergence of stable interaction patterns 
and franchisees’ and employee-managers’ wisdom on how to effectively manage outlets 
according to their franchisor’s concept and specifications. Guidelines, operating procedures 
and standards may be more likely to be accepted and internalized by franchisees and 
employee-managers (Dyer and Singh 1998). Over time and with growing experience, some 
control mechanisms may lose their importance to them.  
Franchisees tend to benefit more intensely of the franchisor’s service assistance and 
knowledge at the beginning of the franchise agreement than later on. The more experience a 
franchisee gains in his business, the less he needs the franchisor’s support (Peterson and Dant 
1990), because, “with increasing experience with franchising, franchisees acquire reasonable 
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proficiency and self-confidence in operating those systems” (Dant and Gundlach 1999, 43). 
Experienced franchisees are likely to know their business, can realistically assess what they 
need to do to be successful in that business, and whether and to what extent the franchise 
arrangement that they are contractually linked with can meet their expectations. Consequently, 
they tend to develop their own attitudes toward service quality that may differ from the 
franchisors’ specifications. The value of prior outlet-specific investments decreases and the 
franchisor’s expertise and value may even be questioned (Cochet, Dormann and Ehrmann 
2008; Grünhagen and Dorsch 2003). The franchisor’s use of more behavior control will lead 
to lower satisfaction among franchisees with more experience. Among relatively more 
experienced franchisees, the use of more outcome control mechanisms that emphasize a 
franchisee’s entrepreneurial autonomy may be preferred to behavior control that tends to 
guide a franchisee’s way to fulfill tasks. We hence assume that the franchisees’ experience 
strengthens the impact of outcome control on franchisee satisfaction.  
H3a:  The extent of perceived outcome control affects the satisfaction of more experienced 
franchisees more positively than that of less experienced franchisees. 
H3b:  The extent of perceived behavior control affects the satisfaction of more experienced 
franchisees more negatively than that of less experienced franchisees. 
There is no evidence on employee-manager satisfaction in franchise systems available. 
The duration of an employer-employee relationship suggests that there are no reasons for an 
employee to leave and strive for other career opportunities. Employee-managers also learn 
and internalize the skills and practices that are associated with a business format over time. At 
the beginning of their employment contract, their experience with their employer’s routines is 
low. Similarly to lowly experienced franchisees, they need to learn skills and practices that 
are specific to the business. Relatively inexperienced employee-managers may appreciate the 
extensive use of mechanisms for behavior control that help them achieve goals and comply 
with contractually specified duties. With growing experience, employee-managers may also 
tend to strive for more autonomy, since they may have internalized the necessary skills and 
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routines over time. Similarly to the franchisees, they may develop their own beliefs about 
service quality and products that may even challenge their corporate management’s standards 
and specifications (Cochet, Dormann and Ehrmann 2008). In contrast, outcome control 
implies an entrepreneurial risk that especially inexperienced employee-managers tend to 
avoid. Later on and with growing experience, employees that stay in the franchise system 
have acquired enough proficiency and self-confidence to deal with outcome control. Given 
that there is a bonus scheme for employees, they are likely to consider outcome control as an 
additional source of income based on the achieved sales volume. Hence, employee-managers’ 
experience affects the relationship between the franchisor’s choice of control mechanisms and 
employee-manager satisfaction as follows:  
H4a:  The extent of perceived outcome control affects the satisfaction of less experienced 
employee-managers more negatively than that of more experienced employee-
managers. 
H4b:  The extent of perceived behavior control affects the satisfaction of less experienced 
employee-managers more positively than that of more experienced employee-
managers. 
Methods 
Sample  
Our sample is based on the largest German franchise system, a tourism company that 
comprises both franchised and company-owned travel agencies under the same brand name. 
In order to get selected as a franchisee in this system, an entrepreneur needs to accept the 
franchisor’s corporate identity and the minimum space that an outlet is expected to provide. 
The franchisee bears the lease rental charges, although he cannot decide independently where 
he leases and how large his outlet should be. The initial investment sum for office equipment 
and accessories ranges from 10,000 to 50,000 Euros and depends on the size of the outlet. 
Licensing fees are 0.07 % on sales of products from the franchisor and 0.13 % on overall sales 
plus a monthly rate of 180 Euros and an advertising fee of 0.2 % on net sales. Thus, a 
franchisee pays a fixed monthly rate and a variable licensing and advertising fee based on 
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sales of products to the franchisor. He generates profits based on a gross margin on sales (end 
customer price minus internal price) minus fees. In addition, the franchisor provides a 
financial incentive at the end of each year in the form of a bonus based on the growth of the 
sales volume as compared to the sales volume at the end of the previous year. The bonus is 
contingent on the growth margins in a franchisee’s sales volume.  
At the outset of our survey, we discussed and agreed upon the items with franchisees and 
employee-managers in the franchise system. We conducted semi-structured expert interviews 
with franchisees and salaried outlet supervisors. All interview partners confirmed that the 
items that we had selected were relevant. Conversations with managers from the headquarters 
and our pretest also showed that the items were relevant to both franchisees and employee-
managers. The complete list of questionnaire items is reported in the appendix.  
The franchisor provided the names and e-mail addresses of the employee-managers of the 
company-owned outlets and the franchisees in the franchise system. We invited them to 
complete our self-administered, web-based questionnaire and ensured that they had to respond 
to our questionnaire themselves. For instance, the web link that was included in our e-mail in 
order to provide access to the web-based questionnaire could not be forwarded to another 
person. Overall, we received 334 usable questionnaires, leading to a response rate of 39.2 
percent. A total of 187 questionnaires were completed by employee-managers (out of 349 
potential respondents, i.e., a response rate of 53.6 percent among employee-managers) and 
147 usable questionnaires were sent back by franchisees (out of 504 potential respondents, i.e., 
a response rate of 29.2 percent). Among the 187 employee-managers, 76 % supervise a single 
outlet, 24 % two outlets. Referring to the 147 franchisees, 30 % are single-unit franchisees, 
54 % operate two units and 16 % more than two units. The high response rates may be 
attributed to advance notifications and the follow-up procedure of sending reminders and 
making additional phone calls as well as to the close relationship between the researchers and 
the corporate managers of that franchise system. Survey sponsorship, especially official or 
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“respected” sponsorship, is generally expected to enhance response rates (Blumberg, Cooper 
and Schindler 2008). The questionnaire that the franchisees were asked to complete was 
announced in advance and strongly promoted by the franchisor. Similarly, the questionnaire 
that was sent to the employee-managers in the company-owned outlets was accompanied by a 
benevolent letter from the CEO of the company, explicitly encouraging the managers’ 
participation in that survey.  
Non-response bias was studied by comparing the responses of initial respondents with 
those that had been received after follow-up procedures. The results did not reveal any 
significant differences between early and late respondents, indicating the representativeness of 
the survey data (Armstrong and Overton 1977). Additionally, we compared some 
characteristics of our respondents with those of non-respondents from the same franchise 
system. Regarding outlet size and age, we could not find any significant differences between 
respondents and non-respondents (Homburg, Wieseke and Hoyer 2009). Consequently, non-
response bias is not a major issue with our data. To avoid social desirability bias the 
questionnaire was administered anonymously and all respondents were repeatedly assured 
that their responses were treated confidentially and used for scientific purposes only (King 
and Bruner 2000). We verified the information gained from employee-managers and 
franchisees with a survey of their responsible managers in the corporate headquarters. All in 
all, 258 questionnaires could be matched with information from the franchisor’s perspective. 
According to the work council’s and the corporate management’s directives and in 
compliance with German labor legislation, we did not collect personal data on, e.g., the 
respondents’ age, gender, education or former professional experience.  
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Variables and Measures 
We use both reflective and formative measurement models.4 Following the reflective 
measurement approach, the dependent variable is satisfaction. According to Ruekert and 
Churchill (1984), satisfaction comprises four dimensions: The product dimension reflects the 
demand for and the quality of the franchisor’s product offerings; the financial dimension 
assesses the franchise system’s attractiveness in terms of its prices; the assistance dimension 
captures the quality of the franchisor’s marketing efforts; and the social interaction dimension 
reflects the cooperation between the franchisor and his franchisees and employee-managers. 
In awareness of these four dimensions, franchisees and employee-managers were asked to 
indicate their satisfaction on a seven-point Likert scale with five items. Product and service 
quality as well as innovation represent the product dimension, prices pertain to the financial 
dimension, the franchisor’s marketing efforts allude to the assistance dimension, and the 
general cooperative climate reflects the social interaction dimension (Gassenheimer, Baucus 
and Baucus 1996; Poppo and Zenger 2002). The results of a factor analysis indicate that the 
five items load on one common factor (Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler 2008). The scores of 
the items are summed and averaged (using equal weights). The Cronbach’s alpha for that 
composite measure is 0.80.  
In order to measure control mechanisms, we use a range of items to construct two 
formative indices (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). The degree of perceived outcome 
control consists of four items addressing standards and guidelines regarding, e.g., sales and 
budgets, planned/actual comparisons, regular reports to the headquarters and other financial 
ratios. Three items concerning personal meetings with the franchisor, the elaboration of the 
franchisor’s directives, and the definition of the franchisor’s (the headquarters’) efforts to alter 
                                                 
4 The chosen measurement model explains the relationship between a latent variable and its corresponding 
indicators. Depending on the causal direction between latent and observable constructs, it is either reflective 
(from the latent construct to its indicators) or formative (from the indicators to the latent construct). Prior 
evidence shows that their simultaneous use in a single study does not jeopardize measurement consistency 
(e.g., Homburg, Hoyer and Fassnacht 2000).  
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processes allude to perceptions of behavior control (Heide, Wathne and Rokkan 2007; Oliver 
and Anderson 1994; Yin and Zajac 2004). Responses are recorded on seven-point Likert 
scales with 1 = “not in use” and 7 = “extensively in use”. The scores are used to calculate 
geometric means for each control type. A geometric mean is appropriate, if the construct is 
the result of a strategy whose components (i.e., the indicators) all find equal application and 
do not compensate each other. Put differently, the impact that a change in one dimension has 
on the change of the entire index depends on the level of the other dimensions, because the 
perception of the franchisor’s use of control depends on the extent of all underlying 
dimensions (Homburg, Hoyer and Fassnacht 2002). The constructs of outcome and behavior 
control represent composites of different indicators that are unique sources of each control 
type and hence need not correlate significantly. Though each item measures a particular 
dimension, it contributes to the total value of one of the two control constructs. 
Franchisees’ and employee-managers’ experience is measured with a single item. Single 
items are appropriate for measuring basic and unidimensional constructs that are simple and 
easily understandable to the respondents. Under those conditions predictions obtained with 
single-item measures are as good as predictions achieved with multi-item measures (Bergkvist 
and Rossiter 2007). Our single item asks for the number of years that the respondents have 
been working as franchisee or employee-manager, respectively, in an outlet in that franchise 
system. Experience is a growth process that is subject to a diminishing effect, since the 
increment in experience decreases from year to year. Therefore, the logarithm of the duration 
of the franchisor-franchisee or employer-employee relationship, respectively, is preferred to 
the untransformed value of the number of years of association with the franchise system 
(Tikoo 2002).  
To strengthen the empirical tests, we control for additional factors in the regressions. 
Outlet size is measured with the number of employees who were working in a unit within the 
franchise system at the time of the survey. Prior studies used size as a proxy for resource 
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scarcity (e.g., Combs and Ketchen 2003). The amount and quality of available resources in an 
outlet influence franchisee and employee-manager satisfaction. Travel agencies are relatively 
small entities. In terms of the number of employees per travel agency, outlets that are run by 
franchisees are hardly larger than those that are supervised by employee-managers. A 
relatively higher unit size can increase both the franchisees’ and the employee-managers’ 
satisfaction levels, but as supervising employees can mean an additional workload for a 
leading individual, rather non-entrepreneurially thinking employees might consider a 
relatively higher size as a burden that decreases their satisfaction, whereas franchisees may be 
more likely to consider it as an indicator of growth and success.  
Tolerance of ambiguity is a trait that differentiates an entrepreneur from a non-
entrepreneur (e.g., Budner 1962). It is “the ability to deal effectively, i.e., without 
experiencing psychological discomfort or threat, with situations or information that are vague, 
incomplete, unstructured, uncertain or unclear” (Schere 1982, 404). We assume that 
franchisees are more likely to tolerate ambiguity than salaried managers and that high 
ambiguity more negatively affects the satisfaction levels of employee-managers than that of 
franchisees. Franchisees and employee-managers were asked to indicate their perceptions of 
ambiguity on a seven-point Likert scale with four items alluding to the frequency of changes 
in underlying skills, the frequency of changes in operating procedures and practices, the 
amount of components that a particular practice includes, and the number and variety of 
solutions for problems that result from practices (Poppo and Zenger 2002). A factor analysis 
indicates that the five items load on one common factor. Using equal weights, we sum and 
average the scores of the items. The Cronbach’s alpha for our composite measure is 0.72.  
From a franchisee’s perspective, in the presence of uncertainty, the franchisor’s service 
assistance and knowledge provide protection and helpful means to achieve the contractually 
specified objectives. Service assistance, a valuable brand name and standard operating 
procedures are likely to be more appreciated in the presence than in the absence of uncertainty, 
JR-FR-35 R3 
 14
because “the more complex and uncertain the environment, the greater the risk attached to an 
agents’ (sic!) achievement of specified outcomes” (Hendry 2002, 105). The same may be true 
for employee-managers, but they enjoy some protection from uncertainty through their 
employment contract and bear a lower entrepreneurial risk than franchisees. Uncertainty is 
hence not likely to strongly enhance the perceived value of the franchisor’s support. More 
precisely, we expect differential effects of this control variable on franchisees’ and employee-
managers’ satisfaction. Our respondents were asked to assess on a seven-point Likert scale the 
difficulty in interpreting the impact of external factors on operating procedures, the difficulty 
in planning sales and the number of customers in a travel agency, the variableness of the 
competitors’ products and services, and the stability of the travel market (Artz and Brush 
2000; Carson, Madhok and Wu 2006). The Cronbach’s alpha for our composite measure is 
0.68, which is a still acceptable value for a newly developed scale (Hair, Tatham, Anderson 
and Black 1998).  
Specificity is included as a control variable in the analyses concerning the franchisees. 
Specific assets are only those assets that are devoted to the franchisor-franchisee relationship. 
They have little value outside the respective franchise system (Williamson 1985). The 
knowledge that franchisees and employee-managers need to perform their tasks is not specific 
to a particular franchise, because German travel agents complete a state-approved 
apprenticeship of up to three years in a travel agency, the hospitality industry, or a tourism 
company. In contrast, tangible assets such as furnishings or equipment can hardly be used in 
other franchise systems, because their design (e.g., color, shape) and functionalities need to 
conform to the requirements of the corporate design and meet the standards of a franchise 
system. Most franchisors define guidelines on how and where to position furniture and 
equipment and what wall paints are acceptable. Franchisees need to invest in system-specific 
assets that bond them to the franchising contract (Bradach 1997; Garg, Rasheed and Priem 
2005; Windsperger 2004). The assets that include, e.g., a unique store design, can no longer 
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be exploited by a franchisee after the franchising contract has been terminated, as they are 
specific to a particular outlet concept (Combs and Ketchen 1999). A single item asked for the 
extent of financial investments in furniture and equipment that were custom-tailored to that 
particular travel agency concept and not redeployable to alternative concepts (Artz and Brush 
2000). The franchisees’ responses were recorded on a seven-point Likert scale with 1 = “fully 
disagree” and 7 = “fully agree”.5  
Data Analysis 
Table 1a and b present means, standard deviations and correlations for the study variables. 
They show that multicollinearity between the study variables is not a problem.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1a and 1b about here 
----------------------------------------- 
In order to test our hypotheses we calculate a series of linear regressions for each of our 
two samples from the same franchise system (Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler 2008). Within 
the constraints set by our data, we have done everything to ensure that our models do not 
suffer from endogeneity bias.6 We expect to find differential effects of the pre-specified 
factors on the franchisees’ and the employee-managers’ satisfaction levels. 7  Further, we 
divide these samples into groups according to their levels of experience. The two samples are 
                                                 
5 Most franchisees lack the experience with switching from one franchise system to another. They might hence 
have difficulties in estimating exact proportions of investments that they would be able to reclaim, if they were 
allowed to use these assets in other franchise systems, or the rate of depreciation of the assets at the end of the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship. 
6 We intensely thought about potential endogeneity problems. Within the constraints set by our data, we have 
done everything to control for the most important factors (omitted variables bias). In addition, the dependent 
variable does not influence the independent variables (simultaneity in results) nor do we have a self-selection 
problem due to truncated or censored samples (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003; Sampson 2004; Winship and 
Mare 1992).  
7 Garg, Rasheed, and Priem (2005) describe the franchisor-franchisee and employer-employee relationships as 
two different agency relationships in the same franchise system. Therefore, our research design is not a 
subgroup analysis and does hence not include a test of differences between parameter estimates between 
franchisees and employee-managers. We follow Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) who expect significant 
effects in one industry but not in the other, which is similar to our idea that one type of control mechanisms 
leads to significant effects in one agency relationship but not in the other. 
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split at the median values for franchisee and employee-manager experience, respectively. 
Regression models are then calculated for each group.  
Results 
Table 2 reports the results of the regression analyses for the effects of control and 
experience on franchisee and employee-manager satisfaction. Hypotheses 1 and 2 assume that 
franchisees and employee-managers perceive the control mechanisms that the franchisor uses 
to monitor their behaviors in different ways. In fact, there are differences between franchisees 
and employee-managers regarding their perceptions of outcome and behavior control.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
As the results in Table 2 show and consistent with Hypothesis 1a, franchisees are likely 
to be more satisfied when they perceive relatively high outcome control. Opposed to 
Hypothesis 1b, employee-managers’ satisfaction is higher, when the franchisor uses more 
outcome control. We gain support for Hypothesis 2b, since employee-managers’ satisfaction 
increases, when more behavior control mechanisms are applied to monitor their efforts. With 
regard to the franchisees, Hypothesis 2a is not supported. Franchisees are not less satisfied, 
when the franchisor uses more behavior control mechanisms. These results remain stable, 
when we further include experience as an additional explanatory variable that neither exerts 
any significant effect on franchisees’ nor on employee-managers’ satisfaction levels. 
Referring to the control variables, the results show that uncertainty increases the actors’ risk 
(Hendry 2002). It mainly exerts a negative and significant effect on franchisees’ satisfaction. 
We have suggested that this effect would be observable in the franchisee sample only. In 
contrast to hired managers, franchisees need to invest specifically and bear a greater risk of 
unemployment. A negative and significant effect is additionally revealed in the control model 
for the employee-manager sample (Model 4 in Table 2). In addition, employee-managers are 
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more satisfied, when they have fewer employees and perceive relatively high ambiguity, 
whereas size and ambiguity do not exert any significant effect on franchisee satisfaction.  
Regarding the differentiation between franchisees and employee-managers with either 
high or low experience in their business (Models 7-10 in Table 3)8, highly experienced 
franchisees appreciate outcome control mechanisms. A t-test shows that the differences 
between franchisees with different experience levels are significant for outcome control (α = 
0.10), hence supporting Hypothesis 3a. Behavior control does not decrease their satisfaction 
under conditions of high experience, lending no support to Hypothesis 3b. Referring to 
employee-managers, different levels of experience have no differential effect on the 
relationship between behavior control and satisfaction, as both highly and lowly experienced 
employee-managers are likely to be more satisfied in the presence of behavior control. Under 
conditions of relatively lower experience, outcome control enhances employee-manager 
satisfaction. Thus, Hypotheses 4a and 4b are not supported.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
Uncertainty exerts a negative influence on franchisees’ and employee-managers’ 
satisfaction under conditions of high but not low experience. This finding indicates that, the 
longer the duration of the franchisor-franchisee or employer-employee relationship, 
respectively, the more franchisees and employee-managers learn about the negative impact of 
uncertainty in the presence of intensified competition. Comparatively lowly experienced 
                                                 
8 On average, franchised and company-owned units have existed for approximately eight years. In awareness that 
the risk of entrepreneurial failure is highest during the first four years after foundation (German Franchise 
Association 2009) and that in most German franchise systems the first franchised unit was established less 
than ten years ago (Franchise-Monitor 2009), this average duration of system affiliation indicates a meaningful 
value of experience. We could only measure the experience that our respondents gained during the time that 
they had been spending in this system. Prior literature from psychology (e.g., Bradley 2010), upper echelons 
research (e.g., Bigley and Wiersema 2002), and franchising (e.g., Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt 2005; Tikoo 
2002) provided examples for similar measures. Therefore, the length of time that a franchisee or an employee-
manager have been spending in a franchise system in that position is an adequate indicator for reflecting an 
individual’s experience in a selected franchise system and in a particular function.  
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employee-managers are more satisfied when their outlets are smaller. Contrary to the models 
drawing on employee-managers, the coefficients for size are not significant in the models that 
pertain to franchisee satisfaction. Ambiguity exerts a positive effect on employee-manager 
satisfaction, indicating that it is perceived as a chance to benefit from a given leeway to act. 
Finally, specificity increases the experience of lowly but not highly experienced franchisees. 
Without the differentiation between experience levels, specificity does not show any 
significant effect on franchisee satisfaction.  
Discussion 
Prior research has collected much knowledge on the franchisor’s benefits of using and 
governing plural form-franchise systems, but studies from the franchisees’ perspective are 
rare and those that additionally consider the employee-managers’ viewpoint are actually 
missing (Cochet, Dormann and Ehrmann 2008; Peterson and Dant 1990; Grünhagen and 
Dorsch 2003; Sorensen and Sørensen 2001). Franchisees and hired outlet managers differ in 
terms of need for achievement, preference for innovation and learning, and the propensity to 
take risks (Sorenson and Sørensen 2001; Stewart, Watson, Carland and Carland 1998). 
Therefore, the franchisor’s choice of control mechanisms for monitoring those actors’ efforts 
within a franchise system may affect satisfaction differently.  
Contributions 
This study contributes to management research in three ways: First, although most 
franchise systems are plural forms and the satisfaction of franchisees and employee-managers 
affects the attractiveness and maintenance of the whole franchise system, the impact of 
different types of control for governing the plural form has not been investigated by prior 
research. Outcome control leads to higher satisfaction among franchisees and employee-
managers, while behavior control only enhances employee-managers’ satisfaction. In addition, 
to our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the consequences of the franchisor’s 
choice of control mechanisms depending on franchisees’ and employee-managers’ experience. 
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While outcome control leads to higher satisfaction among more experienced franchisees, 
behavior control enhances both highly and lowly experienced employee-managers’ 
satisfaction. Our findings provide managerial implications for effective monitoring efforts 
concerning lowly experienced employee-managers and franchisees and employee-managers 
with relatively high experience. However, neither outcome nor behavior control add to rather 
inexperienced franchisees’ satisfaction in this system.  
Second, our results give us hints that the costly control mechanisms seem to work on 
employee-managers whilst franchisees mostly seem to be immune to these. Especially 
behavior control is associated with very high costs and has no impact on franchisees’ 
satisfaction at all. Nevertheless these control mechanisms might be necessary to prevent 
opportunistic behavior from franchisees. Consequently, franchisors might face a dilemma: 
they know that behavior control is costly and does not increase franchisee satisfaction and 
performance, but at the same time might be necessary to prevent opportunism. Therefore, 
control mechanisms serve different functions: increasing satisfaction and performance and 
preventing opportunism. Our research has focused on the former.9  
Third, our theoretical framework is tested with primary data from the largest German 
franchise system. Only few studies have departed from the US-American context before (e.g., 
Barthélemy 2008; Cochet, Dormann and Ehrmann 2008; Windsperger 2004). Many studies 
draw on data from the restaurant sector (e.g., Beheler, Norton and Sen 2008; Grünhagen and 
Dorsch 2003; Hing 1996). Only few authors report results that rely on data from other 
industries (e.g., Knott 2003). Although restaurant chains are especially suitable for explaining 
governance in plural form-franchise systems, the results obtained in that sector cannot easily 
be generalized to other industries (Dant 2008; Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt 2005; Yin and 
Zajac 2004). For instance, restaurant chains are likely to employ a rather low-educated 
                                                 
9 We thank two of the three anonymous reviewers for pointing us into this direction.  
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workforce, whereas travel agents need an occupation-specific and strongly regulated 
vocational training in the German tourism industry. Attitudes towards, e.g., control or leeway 
to act may differ between actors from various industrial and institutional settings. Franchising 
research will not be able to embrace the management of franchise systems realistically, if our 
insights are mainly based on a single industry and a single institutional context, although 
franchising can be found in a great variety of sectors, e.g., gyms, undertakers, pet retail, and 
diet/nutrition counseling, and many different countries outside the North American continent.  
Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
Looking at employee-managers, our findings reveal that outcome control especially 
enhances the satisfaction of relatively lowly experienced employee-managers. It does not 
exert a significant influence on the satisfaction of highly experienced employee-managers. 
This result can be due to the increasingly uncertain tourism industry. For instance, the Internet 
has dramatically changed the competitive position of tourism companies, hotels, airlines, 
customers, tour operators, and travel agencies. The bargaining power of consumers and 
tourism suppliers has been strengthened, because they can communicate directly at the 
expense of the position of intermediaries such as travel agencies (Buhalis and Zoge 2007). 
While employee-managers enjoy a certain protection from environmental threats, franchisees 
fear that their existence as entrepreneurs is put at risk. Thereby, lowly experienced employee-
managers seem to view outcome control as an opportunity to generate additional income in 
terms of bonuses based on the achieved sales volume, while their more experienced 
colleagues may have learned over time that, under deteriorating conditions for travel agencies, 
the franchisor’s requirements associated with behavior control can more easily be satisfied 
than those pertaining to outcome control. Put differently, an employee’s constant monthly 
salary may be perceived as more beneficial than entrepreneurial freedom. Future studies may 
compare our findings on control and satisfaction with those from other industries.  
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The R2-values for the franchisees in our models are relatively low. This is not unusual for 
studies that explore new ideas and test them for the first time and provide opportunities for 
future studies to include additional variables that could be important. In addition to control 
mechanisms that were center stage in our study we expect that personal variables of the 
franchisees and employee-managers, like age, gender, marital status and educational 
background influence also satisfaction. Furthermore, we could only measure the experience 
that our respondents gained during the time that they had been spending in this franchise 
system in their function as a franchisee or a salaried outlet supervisor, respectively. It would 
have been interesting to learn more on their functions and positions prior to their entry into 
the franchise system. Future studies should control for these issues and their differential 
effects on franchisee and employee-manager satisfaction.  
Overall, we hope that our study will be seen as an innovation in the franchising literature, 
since it is one of the rare exceptions that juxtaposes both franchisees’ and employee-
managers’ perspectives, thereby illustrating differences between franchisees and employee-
managers that may justify the franchisor’s reliance on different treatments. It examines an 
under-researched issue that alludes to the post-formation franchise system management and 
provides new knowledge on the interplay between control, experience and satisfaction in 
plural form-franchise systems.  
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Table 1.  
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
 
(a) Franchisees:  
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 satisfaction 4.902 0.909 1.000        
2 size 5.860 8.414 -0.078 1.000       
3 ambiguity 5.371 0.966 -0.008 -0.145 1.000      
4 uncertainty  4.549 1.104 -0.171* -0.115 0.395** 1.000     
5 specificity 5.300 1.734 0.073 0.111 0.145 -0.014 1.000    
6 experience 0.862 0.268 -0.030 0.221** 0.064 0.077 0.096 1.000   
7 outcome control 4.170 1.392 0.214** -0.226** 0.120 -0.026 0.143 0.008 1.000  
8 behavior control  4.141 1.430 0.140 -0.160 0.099 -0.151 0.085 -0.051 0.161 1.000 
N = 147.  
Significance levels: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. 
 
(b) Employee-Managers:  
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 satisfaction 5.032 0.982 1.000       
2 size 4.780 2.331 -0.146* 1.000      
3 ambiguity 5.342 1.005 0.272** 0.022 1.000     
4 uncertainty  4.572 1.212 -0.093 -0.051 0.220** 1.000    
5 experience 0.808 0.358 0.017 -0.089 0.199** -0.048 1.000   
6 outcome control 5.779 1.012 0.257** -0.027 0.199** 0.000 -0.051 1.000  
7 behavior control  3.061 1.180 0.301** 0.106 0.097 0.196** 0.002 0.137 1.000 
N = 187.  
Significance levels: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. 
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Table 2.  
Results of the Regression Analyses for the Impact of Control on Satisfaction 
Model  1 2 3  4 5 6 
Variables Hypotheses Franchisees Hypotheses Employee-Managers
Constant  5.279*** (0.494) 
4.680*** 
(0.546) 
4.682*** 
(0.576)  
4.359*** 
(0.434) 
2.937*** 
(0.536) 
3.039*** 
(0.557) 
Size  -0.011 (0.009) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.008 
(0.010)  
-0.068* 
(0.029) 
-0.076** 
(0.028) 
-0.078** 
(0.028) 
ambiguity  0.043 (0.086) 
0.009 
(0.086) 
0.009 
(0.087)  
0.305*** 
(0.069) 
0.235** 
(0.068) 
0.246** 
(0.070) 
uncertainty  -0.165* (0.074) 
-0.135† 
(0.074) 
-0.135† 
(0.075)  
-0.138* 
(0.058) 
-0.086 
(0.056) 
-0.090 
(0.056) 
specificity  0.039 (0.044) 
0.024 
(0.044) 
0.024 
(0.044)  - - - 
outcome control H1a (+)  0.111† (0.056) 
0.111† 
(0.056) H1b (-)  
0.164* 
(0.066) 
0.160* 
(0.066) 
behavior control H2b (-)  0.061 (0.054) 
0.061 
(0.055) H2b (+)  
0.210*** 
(0.057) 
0.209*** 
(0.057) 
experience    -0.003 (0.288)    
-0.130 
(0.188) 
         
R2  0.05 0.09 0.09  0.12 0.22 0.22 
adj. R2  0.02 0.05 0.04  0.11 0.20 0.20 
F  1.77 2.23* 1.90†  8.67*** 10.26*** 8.61*** 
N  147 147 147  187 187 187 
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: satisfaction.  
    † p < 0.100 
    * p < 0.050 
  ** p < 0.010 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 3.  
Results of the Regression Analyses for the Combined Effect of Experience and Control on Satisfaction 
Model  7 8  9 10 
  Franchisees  Employee-Managers 
  Experience  Experience 
Variables Hypotheses High Low High Low Hypotheses High Low High Low 
Constant  5.716*** (0.700) 
4.357*** 
(0.739) 
4.886*** 
(0.737) 
4.298*** 
(0.894)  
5.107*** 
(0.640) 
3.772*** 
(0.618) 
3.772*** 
(0.784) 
2.248** 
(0.785) 
Size  -0.011 (0.010) 
0.028 
(0.047) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
0.029 
(0.050)  
-0.056 
(0.041) 
-0.097* 
(0.045) 
-0.058 
(0.039) 
-0.103* 
(0.043) 
ambiguity  0.032 (0.115) 
-0.005 
(0.136) 
-0.022 
(0.114) 
-0.008 
(0.141)  
0.204* 
(0.093) 
0.391** 
(0.109) 
0.175† 
(0.090) 
0.287** 
(0.109) 
uncertainty  -0.193* (0.092) 
-0.030 
(0.126) 
-0.155† 
(0.091) 
-0.028 
(0.131)  
-0.192** 
(0.071) 
-0.078 
(0.096) 
-0.127† 
(0.071) 
-0.044 
(0.093) 
specificity  -0.012 (0.057) 
0.123† 
(0.070) 
-0.041 
(0.056) 
0.122† 
(0.072)  - - - - 
outcome control H3a (+)   0.177* (0.068) 
0.000 
(0.106) H4a (-)   
0.092 
(0.082) 
0.234* 
(0.108) 
behavior control H3b (-)   0.081 (0.065) 
0.017 
(0.105) H4b (+)   
0.214** 
(0.071) 
0.196* 
(0.095) 
           
R2  0.06 0.07 0.15 0.08  0.12 0.16 0.22 0.25 
adj. R2  0.02 0.00 0.09 0.04  0.09 0.13 0.17 0.21 
F  1.40 1.00 2.47* 0.65  4.16** 5.23** 5.00*** 5.50*** 
N  90 57 90 57  97 90 97 90 
Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: satisfaction.  
    † p < 0.100 
    * p < 0.050 
  ** p < 0.010 
*** p < 0.001 
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Appendix: Questionnaire Items 
Variable Items Scale References 
satisfaction 
We are satisfied with the quality of the products and 
services (product dimension). 
1 = fully disagree,  
...,  
7 = fully agree 
 
α = 0.80 
Gassenheimer, 
Baucus, and 
Baucus (1996); 
Ruekert and 
Churchill (1984) 
We are satisfied with the prices for the products and 
services (financial dimension). 
We are satisfied with the product innovations of the 
franchise system (product dimension). 
We are satisfied with the franchisor's (the headquarters’) 
marketing efforts (assistance dimension). 
We are satisfied with the cooperation with the 
franchisor (the headquarters) (general cooperative 
climate). 
independent variables: 
Heide, Wathne, 
and Rokkan 
(2007); Oliver and 
Anderson (1994); 
Yin and Zajac 
(2004) 
outcome 
control 
standards and guidelines regarding, e.g., sales and 
budgets 
1 = not at all in 
use,  
...,  
7 = extensively in 
use 
 
formative indices 
planned/actual comparisons 
miscellaneous financial ratios 
regular reports to the franchisor (the headquarters) 
behavior 
control 
personal meetings with the franchisor (the headquarters) 
The franchisor (the headquarters) makes sure everyone 
knows what to do and how to do it.  
precise definition of the franchisor’s (the headquarters’) 
efforts to alter processes 
experience 
number of years that the respondents have been working 
as franchisees or employee-managers in an outlet in the 
franchise system 
count measure 
(logarithm) Tikoo (2002) 
control variables:  
outlet size number of employees in an outlet count measure  
ambiguity 
The skills and capabilities that we need to perform our 
tasks are rapidly changing. 1 = fully disagree,  
...,  
7 = fully agree 
 
α = 0.72 
Poppo and Zenger 
(2002) 
The operating procedures and practices are rapidly 
changing. 
Our current operating procedures and practices are an 
outcome of a great variety of ways to perform tasks. 
Difficulties pertaining to the operating procedures can 
be overcome with many different solutions. 
uncertainty 
It is difficult to interpret the impact of external factors 
on our operating procedures. 1 = fully disagree,  
...,  
7 = fully agree 
 
α = 0.68 
Artz and Brush 
(2000); Carson, 
Madhok, and Wu 
(2006) 
It is difficult to plan sales and the number of customers 
in this travel agency. 
The competitors' products and services are highly 
variable. 
The travel market is not stable at all.  
specificity 
We have made high financial investments in furniture 
and equipment that are custom-tailored to this franchise 
system.  
1 = fully disagree,  
...,  
7 = fully agree 
Artz and Brush 
(2000)  
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